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INTRODUCTION
Of all the sinister things that Internet viruses do, this
might be the worst: They can make you an unsuspecting
collector of child pornography. Heinous pictures and videos
can be deposited on computers by viruses—the malicious
programs better known for swiping your credit card
numbers. In this twist, it’s your reputation that’s stolen.
Pedophiles can exploit virus-infected PCs to remotely store
and view their stash without fear they’ll get caught.

*
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Pranksters or someone trying to frame you can tap viruses
to make it appear that you surf illegal Web sites. Whatever
the motivation, you get child porn on your computer—and
might not realize it until police knock at your door.1
Operating under an enormous social impact associated with
inconsistently prosecuting child pornography cases, new defenses
involving the possession requirement under the Child Pornography
Prevention Act (CPPA), such as the increasingly raised Trojan Horse
Defense, have courts scrambling for clarity when determining the
possession element in child pornography cases.2 Quandaries concerning
the element of possession result from discrepancies among courts as to
whether or not a child pornography defendant must actively download the
pornographic material.3 While some courts demand the government prove
the defendant downloaded the material, other courts consider the
discovery of child pornography in the Internet cache of the defendant’s

1

Associated Press, Framed for Child Porn – by a PC Virus, MSNBC, Nov. 8, 2009,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/33778733/ns/technology_and_science-security/.
2

See United States v. Plugh, 576 F.3d 135, 138 (2d Cir. 2009) (showing defendant
initially claimed that his computer was infected with a virus that downloaded child
pornography onto his computer); United States v. Stulock, 308 F.3d 922, 925 (8th Cir.
2002) (addressing what constitutes possession when dealing with Internet child
pornography); United States v. Grober, 595 F. Supp. 2d 382, 408 (D.N.J. 2008) (calling
dissemination of child pornography a “grave impact on society”).
3

See United States v. Shaffer, 472 F.3d 1219, 1220–21 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding
defendant guilty under the CPPA for downloading child pornography); United States v.
Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 999 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Mohrbacher, 182 F.3d
1041, 1048–51 (9th Cir. 1999)) (expressing the court’s intent that when defendant
physically downloads child pornography that defendant may be prosecuted for possessing
child pornography); Stulock, 308 F.3d at 925 (finding defendant not guilty because
conviction under the CPPA requires that defendant download, not merely view, child
pornography); United States v. Navrestad, 66 M.J. 262, 268 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (concluding
that where defendant neither downloaded nor saved child pornography to his hard drive,
he could not be found guilty under pertinent child pornography laws).
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computer sufficient to prove the possession element.4 Further, many courts
refuse to convict defendants who merely viewed the child pornography.5
Shedding light on the possession issue is the “intent to view” language the
2008 amendments to the CPPA added to the act.6 The social impact of
inconsistent prosecutions in child pornography cases is immense, and
courts must remember the extensive legislative history behind Congress’s
enactment of the CPPA when determining possession in child
pornography cases. Against the amended language, courts should find that
downloading child pornography, discovering it in the Internet cache,
and/or merely viewing such material all constitute “intent to view” and
satisfy the possession requirement of the CPPA.7
Through the passage of the CPPA, Congress sought to protect
children from becoming victims of sexual abuse via the production,
dissemination, and possession of child pornography.8 More recently,
courts have inconsistently decided similar child pornography cases due to
novel issues associated with proving the possession element of the CPPA

4

See infra note 18 and accompanying text (further discussion of Internet Cache).

5

See, e.g., United States v. Kuchinski, 469 F.3d 853, 862–63 (9th Cir. 2006) (upholding
precedent that defendants who merely view child pornography and unknowingly save
files to the Internet Cache or Temporary Internet Files cannot be convicted of possession
of child pornography under the CPPA).
6

See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (Supp. II 2008).

7

See id.

8

18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (Supp. II 1996) (“Any person who . . . knowingly possesses
any book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, computer disk, or any other material that
contains 3 or more images of child pornography that has been mailed, or shipped or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, or
that was produced using materials that have been mailed, or shipped or transported in
interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, shall be punished
as provided in subsection (b).”); see H.R. 3726, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005); H.R. 4331,
104th Cong. § 2 (1996); H.R. 4123, 104th Cong. § 2 (1996); S. 1237, 104th Cong. § 2
(1995) (setting forth the reasons why legislation to protect children from child
pornography is imperative).

3
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and difficulties that arise when defendants raise the Trojan Horse
Defense.9 While successful uses of these defenses in England provide the
defenses with some legitimacy, it is imperative that courts do not neglect
to consider the intent behind Congress’s enactment of the CPPA when
scrutinizing these cases.10
As the Internet continues to expand, so too does the ability of sexual
predators to easily produce and propagate child pornography globally.11
As one commentator notes:
[C]omputers with Internet access have become a frightful
weapon by creating a new avenue for sexual offenders to
produce, exploit, and disseminate illicit images, particularly
those relating to child pornography. The accessibility,
affordability, and anonymity presented by downloading

9

See United States v. Plugh, 576 F.3d 135, 138 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussing defendant’s
attempt to invoke the Trojan Horse Defense and later admitting that he falsified the
claim); United States v. Shiver, 305 F. App’x 640, 643 (11th Cir. 2008) (arguing that a
computer virus downloaded child pornography on defendant’s computer which resulted
in his indictment); United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 65 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing
how defendant claimed that a computer virus, not defendant, downloaded child
pornography); United States v. O’Keefe, 461 F.3d 1338, 1341, 1345 (11th Cir. 2006)
(discussing defendant’s conviction despite his Trojan Horse Defense); United States v.
Bass, 411 F.3d 1198, 1200 (10th Cir. 2005) (convicting defendant despite his argument
that a computer virus saved child pornography images on his computer); United States v.
Vaughn, Cr. No. F. 05-00482 OWW, 2008 WL 4104241, at *22 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2008)
(rejecting post-trial argument of Trojan Horse Defense).
10

See John Schwartz, Acquitted Man Says Virus Put Pornography on Computer, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 11, 2003, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2003/08/11/technology/11PORN.html?scp=1&sq=%22Acquitted%20Man%20Says%20
Virus%20Put%20Pornography%20On%20Computer%22&st=cse
(discussing
how
defendant in England successfully utilized the Trojan Horse Defense in his child
pornography case).
11

See Emily Brant, Comment, Sentencing “Cybersex Offenders”: Individual Offenders
Require Individualized Conditions when Courts Restrict Their Computer Use and
Internet Access, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 779, 782 (2009) (discussing how laws have been
enacted that prevent judges from implementing specific restrictions on sex offenders
regarding their ability to access computers connected to Internet and Internet websites).

4
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child pornography from the Internet has created a “nearly
perfect medium for offenders seeking children for sex.”12
As sexual offenders become more Internet savvy, courts must be armed
with knowledge regarding the typical problems associated with these
prosecutions and the novel defenses that will likely be raised. Courts
should diligently attempt to prosecute these Internet child pornography
cases consistently with Congress’s intent behind the CPPA to prevent the
sexual abuse of children that stems from child pornography.
Although Congress enacted the CPPA in 1996, the Act underwent
significant amendments in October of 2008.13 These amendments are
12

Id. at 780 (citing Art Bowker & Michael Gray, An Introduction to the Supervision of
the Cybersex Offender, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 2004, at 3); see also Andrew Bates &
Caroline Metcalf, A Psychometric Comparison of Internet and Non-Internet Sex
Offenders from a Community Treatment Sample, 13 J. SEXUAL AGGRESSION 11, 11
(2007) (“[A]ccess to . . . ‘child pornography’ . . . has been made much easier than ever
before [as a result of the growth of the Internet] . . . .”).
13

Originally, the provision read:
Any person who . . . knowingly possesses any book, magazine,
periodical, film, videotape, computer disk, or any other material that
contains 3 or more images of child pornography that has been mailed,
or shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce by any
means, including by computer, or that was produced using materials
that have been mailed, or shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce by any means, including by computer, shall be punished as
provided in subsection (b).

18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (Supp. II 1996). As amended in 2008, it reads:
Any person who . . . knowingly possesses, or knowingly accesses with
intent to view, any book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape,
computer disk, or any other material that contains an image of child
pornography that has been mailed, or shipped or transported using any
means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting
interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer,
or that was produced using materials that have been mailed, or shipped
or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any
means, including by computer; . . . shall be punished as provided in
subsection (b).

5
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notable because of their addition of the language “intent to view.”14 Prior
to these amendments, there was no law criminalizing the mere viewing of
child pornography in the United States.15 But despite the 2008
amendments to the CPPA, courts will seemingly still face similar
problems concerning the possession requirement and the Trojan Horse
Defense.
Compounding the issue of possession is that courts must now
determine what constitutes “intent to view.”16 Although Congress has
evidently criminalized the mere viewing of child pornography, it has also
attempted to expand the CPPA through the language of the 2008
amendments.17 When a defendant has pornography in his Internet Cache
and/or Temporary Internet Files, regardless of whether or not the
defendant downloaded or manually saved the child pornography to the
computer’s hard drive, the CPPA requires the defendant’s conviction.18

18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (Supp. II 2008) (emphasis added).
14

18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (Supp. II 2008).

15

See, e.g., United States v. Stulock, 308 F.3d 922, 925 (8th Cir. 2002) (discussing the
district court’s holding that merely viewing child pornography images without
intentionally downloading or saving the images does not satisfy the possession element of
the CPPA); United States v. Navrestad, 66 M.J. 262, 268 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (holding that
viewing images of child pornography without saving or downloading the images does not
constitute possession).
16

18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (Supp. II 2008).

17

See id.

18

See United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 993 n.1 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The ‘internet
cache’ or ‘internet temporary folder’ is a ‘set of files kept by a web browser to avoid
having to download the same material repeatedly. Most web browsers keep copies of all
the web pages that you view, up to a certain limit, so that the same images can be
redisplayed quickly when you go back to them.’”) (quoting DOUGLAS DOWNING ET AL.,
DICTIONARY OF COMPUTER AND INTERNET TERMS 149 (8th ed. 2003)); Stulock, 308 F.3d
at 925 (“The browser cache contains images automatically stored by the computer when a
web site is visited so that upon future visits the images need not be downloaded again,
thereby improving the response time. Unlike the other files recovered, the images in the
browser cache had not been deleted and then recovered.”); United States v. Tucker, 305
F.3d 1193, 1198 n.7 (10th Cir. 2002) (defining an Internet cache as “a location on a

6
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Therefore, although Congress attempted to resolve the problems
surrounding the possession element of the CPPA through the 2008
amendments, courts will still have to determine how to execute the
amendments.
This note untangles courts’ problems with the prosecution of child
pornography defendants and aims to redirect attention to the social impact
associated with these crimes. Part I sets forth the evolution of the CPPA
and its goals and shortcomings. Part II further explains the development of
child pornography prosecutions in the United States through two cases that
illustrate the government’s desire to prosecute child pornography
defendants.
Moreover, Part II explains the difficulties courts have encountered
in the prosecution of child pornography cases due to questions arising out
of the possession element of child pornography statutes and from the
frequently invoked Trojan Horse Defense. It will clarify problems that
courts will continue to face, regardless of the recent amendments to the
CPPA, and challenges that courts should understand.
Part III discusses the tremendous impact that child pornography has on
society and demonstrates that inconsistent prosecutions of child
pornography cases only furthers this negative social impact. Part III also
explicates how Congress enumerated many reasons for enacting the CPPA
and intended for the Act to be used to decrease and eliminate the
dissemination of child pornography in the United States. Finally, Part IV
offers a conclusion affirming the struggles that courts face when
prosecuting child pornography defendants and the necessity for courts to
consider Congress’s intent through the enactment of the CPPA and similar
laws.

computer’s hard drive that contains ‘a collection of data images typically that have been
gleaned from your travels around the Internet.’”).

7
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The Problematic Development of the
Child Pornography Prevention Act
Although numerous cases have argued that the CPPA is
unconstitutional for overbreadth reasons, the Supreme Court and lower
courts have consistently upheld its constitutionality and found that the
First Amendment does not protect the production and dissemination of
child pornography.19 The only substantial limitation on the CPPA came
from the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition.20
The Ashcroft court determined that the provision of the CPPA that
criminalized “virtual child pornography,” that is, materials which appear
to involve minors partaking in sexual conduct, but which are produced
using computer technology or legal consenting adults who look like
minors, was substantially overbroad.21 Regardless of the Ashcroft

19

See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (holding that the First
Amendment does not protect child pornography); Free Speech Coal. v. Reno, 198 F.3d
1083, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that while certain amendments to the CPPA contain
unconstitutionally vague language, “the law is enforceable”); see also Osborne v. Ohio,
495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990) (holding that an Ohio statute “may constitutionally proscribe
the possession and viewing of child pornography”).

20

535 U.S. 234, 256, 258 (2002) (finding the CPPA provisions banning virtual child
pornography unconstitutional because they violated the First Amendment as overbroad).
21

Id. at 239–41. Prior to the Ashcroft decision, the CPPA criminalized receipt,
possession, and distribution of child pornography and virtual pornography, which does
not utilize real minors. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (Supp. II 1996). The Ashcroft court
reasoned:
The CPPA prohibits speech despite its serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value. The statute proscribes the visual depiction
of an idea-that of teenagers engaging in sexual activity-that is a fact of
modern society and has been a theme in art and literature throughout
the ages. . . . Both themes-teenage sexual activity and the sexual abuse
of children-have inspired countless literary works. . . . Contemporary
movies pursue similar themes. . . . Whether or not [these contemporary
films] violate the CPPA, they explore themes within the wide sweep of
the statute’s prohibitions. If these films, or hundreds of others of lesser
note that explore those subjects, contain a single graphic depiction of

8
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decision, courts have frequently and consistently utilized the CPPA and its
amendments.22
B. New York v. Ferber and Its Expansion in Osborne v. Ohio
Not only has Congress established a multitude of reasons for
convicting defendants for possession of child pornography, but the
Supreme Court has also expressed its opinion on the importance of
protecting children from sexual abuse.23 In New York v. Ferber, the
Supreme Court outlined five specific reasons why it is imperative to deem
child pornography as illegal and unprotected by the First Amendment to
United States Constitution.24
First, states have an interest “in ‘safeguarding “the physical and
psychological well-being of a minor.’”25 Second, child pornography is a
“permanent record” of the harmful acts done to minors, and the
government aims to prevent further distribution of such illegal material.26
Third, “[t]he advertising and selling of child pornography” works to

sexual activity within the statutory definition, the possessor of the film
would be subject to severe punishment without inquiry into the work’ s
redeeming value. This is inconsistent with an essential First
Amendment rule: The artistic merit of a work does not depend on the
presence of a single explicit scene.
Ashcroft, 535 U.S. 246–48. Therefore, the section of the CPPA that corresponded to
criminalizing virtual child pornography was stricken as unconstitutional. Id. at 258.
22

See supra notes 13–15 (discussing the 2008 amendments to the CPPA).

23

See Osborne, 495 U.S. at 110; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 749.

24

Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756–64; cf. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72
(1942) (enumerating narrow classes of speech, the prevention of which has never raised a
constitutional problem).

25
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756–57 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S.
596, 607 (1982)).
26

Id. at 759.
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continue to promote the economic incentive to the child pornography
business.27 Fourth, there is little to no value associated with child
pornography.28 Fifth, there is a necessity in protecting children.29 It is
therefore imperative that the legislative intent associated with the CPPA
not be neglected when courts encounter difficulties either in establishing
the possession element of the CPPA or with theoretical defenses.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Problems Associated with Proving the
Possession Element of the CPPA
Possession is the most frequently argued element of the CPPA.30
Because Congress and states refuse to define “possession” in the CPPA
and in related state child pornography laws, individual courts each face the
task of defining the term.31 This has led to courts inconsistently
determining child pornography cases based on whether or not the
defendant “knowingly possessed” the illegal pornographic material under
the CPPA and its military and state law equivalents.32 Some courts convict
27

Id. at 761.

28

Id. at 762.

29

Id. at 763–64.

30

See, e.g., United States v. Shaffer, 472 F.3d 1219, 1226 (10th Cir. 2007) (discussing
mens rea required for “possession” under the CPPA); United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d
990, 1000–02 (9th Cir. 2006) (concluding that defendant satisfied possession element of
the CPPA by viewing child pornography and having it stored in Internet Cache).
31

See Romm, 455 F.3d at 999 (determining that “Congress intended to apply traditional
concepts of possession” under the CPPA); State v. Scolaro, 910 N.E.2d 126, 133 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2009) (“Illinois’s child-pornography statute does not define ‘possess.’”);
Commonwealth v. Simone, 63 Va. Cir. 216, 259 (2003) (“The Virginia child
pornography statute does not define ‘possession,’ nor has this Court found any opinions
of Virginia courts addressing this issue.”).
32

Compare Romm, 455 F.3d at 1000–01 (concluding that viewing child pornography and
storing images in the Internet Cache satisfied the possession element of the CPPA),
United States v. Tucker, 305 F.3d 1193, 1205 (10th Cir. 2002) (determining that although
defendant never downloaded child pornography he was still guilty under the CPPA

10
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defendants when they merely view child pornography websites that
automatically save the material in the viewer’s Temporary Internet Files or
Internet Cache, while other courts have determined that these situations do
not lead to a conviction.33
Although the October 2008 amendments to the CPPA include
“intent to view” as a form of possession, it is still unclear as to whether the
issues related to proving the element of possession have been solved.34
Therefore, because the fundamental purpose behind the Act is to protect
children from sexual abuse, courts should convict when child pornography
files are located in the Internet Cache.35 Courts should especially convict
when computer forensic expert examiners discover that the defendant
searched for child pornography on the Internet, regardless of whether or
not the user physically downloaded any files.36

because he was aware it was being stored in the web browser’s cache), and Scolaro, 910
N.E.2d at 131–32 (determining that controlling images in a computer hard drive’s
Internet Cache satisfied the possession element), with United States v. Stulock, 308 F.3d
922, 925 (8th Cir. 2002) (stating the district court’s finding that a defendant cannot be
guilty of possession of a picture stored in an Internet browser’s cache “without having
purposely saved or downloaded the image”), and United States v. Navrestad, 66 M.J.
262, 268 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (explaining that defendant could not be convicted of
possessing child pornography because although the public computer used to access
Internet and illegal pornographic material saved images in Temporary Internet Files,
defendant was unaware of this process and was not in control of child pornography).
33

See cases cited supra note 32.

34

For a further discussion on how courts will seemingly continue to face issues
associated with the possession element of the CPPA and the Trojan Horse Defense, see
infra notes 116–118 and accompanying text.

35

“The Government has a compelling State interest in protecting children from those
who sexually exploit them, and this interest extends to stamping out the vice of child
pornography at all levels in the distribution chain.”. H.R. 3726, 109th Cong. § 2(2)(C)
(2005); see also H.R. 4331, 104th Cong. §2 (1996); H.R. 4123, 104th Cong. §2 (1996); S.
1237, 104th Cong. §2 (1996); S. 1237, 104th Cong. §2 (1995).
36

See Stulock, 308 F.3d at 926 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding no clear error in the decision that
defendant’s search for and receipt of child pornography was sufficient to establish
possession); Scolaro, 910 N.E.2d at 133 (holding that to determine possession the court

11
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1. Downloading as a Requirement to Convict in United States v. Stulock
Although the 2008 amendments to the CPPA include an additional
way for a person to be convicted for child pornography with the “intent to
view” language, courts must still determine if they will require defendants
to have downloaded the child pornography in order to satisfy either the
possession or “intent to view” elements of the CPPA.37 Prior to the 2008
amendments, the only way courts consistently convicted child
pornography defendants was when the defendants physically controlled
the illegal paraphernalia by downloading the material.38 By concluding
that “possession” or “intent to view” can be satisfied only when the child
pornography defendant has downloaded the material, courts permit
numerous other defendants to bypass conviction under the CPPA.
In United States v. Stulock, the court convicted the defendant of
receiving child pornography but acquitted him of a charge for possessing
child pornography.39 This outcome illustrates courts’ inconsistencies in
deciding child pornography cases. If a defendant receives child
pornography, he must also possess it.40
In Stulock, authorities raided a business known to use the Internet
to sell child pornography.41 During the raid, law enforcement officers
discovered a customer list that provided names and e-mail addresses of
those people who had purchased child pornography from the company.42

must ask if “defendant specifically [sought] out the prohibited images and [if] he [had]
the ability to exercise dominion and control over these images”).
37

18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (Supp. II 2008).

38

See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.

39

308 F.3d at 925.

40

See id.

41

Id. at 924.

42

Id.

12
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Once Stulock’s information was obtained from the confiscated customer
list, officers set up a scheme to lure former customers of the raided
company into ordering more child pornography.43 Stulock ultimately
purchased some child pornography from the sting operation.44 Through
this purchase, law enforcement obtained a search warrant for Stulock’s
home and seized his computer.45
Upon searching Stulock’s computer, agents discovered that
Stulock searched for and visited numerous child pornography websites
and that he had deleted child pornography files off his computer.46
Computer forensics recovered these files in the hard drive’s Temporary
Internet Files.47 When a computer has images, including child
pornography, in the Temporary Internet Files, computer forensic experts
infer that the computer user “had either purposely downloaded the image
in a ZIP file or had opened an image stored elsewhere on the disk using a
viewer that created a temporary copy.”48
The problem in Stulock was that the court, unconvinced by the
evidence presented at trial regarding the possession of child pornography
charge,49 required evidence that the defendant had physically downloaded
the illegal pornographic material.50 The defendant argued that he did not

43

Id.

44

Id.

45

Id.

46

Id.

47

Id.

48

Id.

49

Id. at 926 (acknowledging that “pop-ups and other techniques” might “account for
some of the” child pornography).

50

Id. at 925.

13
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knowingly possess the illegal material and that “aggressive [I]nternet porn
sites” placed child pornography onto his computer.51 The court concluded:
Although [aggressive pornography websites and pop-ups]
could account for some of the material, viewing the
evidence as a whole, [the court could not] say it was clear
error to find that Stulock’s possession of images containing
violent child pornography was an act committed during his
search for and receipt of the child pornography video that
was the basis of the charged offense.52
The Stulock court ultimately convicted the defendant for receiving child
pornography, but it neglected to consider Congress’s intent in enacting the
CPPA when the court acquitted Stulock of the possession of child
pornography charge.53 Under the 2008 amendments, with “intent to view”
as an additional avenue of convicting a defendant, the Stulock court would
arguably still struggle to convict the defendant.54 However, courts facing
similar situations should not require evidence that defendants physically
downloaded the child pornography in order to convict.
2. The Development of Cache as a Fulfillment of Possession
While some American courts convict child pornography
defendants when law enforcement agents seize their computers and
discover child pornography in the Temporary Internet Files or Internet
Cache of the computer’s hard drive, other courts require the defendant to
download the illegal material in order to convict.55 Two fundamental child
51

Id. at 926.

52

Id.

53

See id. at 925; see also United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 999 (9th Cir. 2006)
(finding congressional intent behind the CPPA was “to apply traditional concepts of
possession”); H.R. 3726, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005); H.R. 4331, 104th Cong. § 2 (1996);
H.R. 4123, 104th Cong. § 2 (1996); S. 1237, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995).
54

See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (Supp. II 2008).

55

See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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pornography cases found defendants guilty of possessing illegal
pornography when they merely viewed the material and were aware that
their computers saved the images in folders known as Temporary Internet
Files or an Internet Cache.56 With the 2008 amendments to the CPPA,
regardless of a defendant’s knowledge that hard drives automatically save
images, including child pornography, to his or her cache files, a defendant
should be convicted under the “intent to view” theory.57
In United States v. Tucker, the defendant, a convicted felon, was
charged with possessing child pornography after he showed a friend illegal
images on his computer and told the friend that he came across a minor
girl, whom he hoped to meet.58 The friend informed the proper authorities,
who then arrested the defendant.59 Upon inspection of the defendant’s
computer, a computer forensics officer discovered numerous files the
defendant recently deleted from his machine, which were “located in the
computer’s recycle bin and in ‘unallocated’ hard drive space.”60 Agents
also noticed that the defendant frequented sexual newsgroups with names
alluding to child pornography.61
The Tucker court held that the defendant’s knowledge that the
child pornography images he viewed were automatically saved in the
Internet Cache was sufficient to establish possession and thus upheld his

56

See, e.g., Romm, 455 F.3d at 998; United States v. Tucker, 305 F.3d 1193, 1198–99
(10th Cir. 2002).
57

See Enhancing the Effective Prosecution of Child Pornography Act of 2007, Pub. L.
No. 110-358, §203, 122 Stat. 4001 (2008) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(4)–(5))
(inserting “knowingly accesses with intent to view” to obtain effective prosecution in
child pornography cases); see also Romm, 455 F.3d at 999 (determining that Congress
intended “to apply traditional concepts of possession,” such as the exercise of dominion
and control).
58

Tucker, 305 F.3d at 1195–96.

59

Id. at 1196–97.

60

Id. at 1197–98.

61

Id. at 1196–97.
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conviction.62 The court determined that proving the defendant not only
viewed the images but also knew they would be saved was essential,
because viewing without possession was not sufficient to sustain a
conviction under the CPPA.63 Ultimately, the defendant admitted to
knowing that when visiting a website, such as one where he could view
child pornography, the information from the website would be “sent to his
browser cache file and thus saved on his hard drive.”64 Therefore, the
court decided the defendant knowingly possessed the child pornography
and convicted him under the CPPA.65
In United States v. Romm, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the Tucker
court’s holding that child pornography defendants may be convicted when
the material is knowingly stored in the Internet Cache, even though the
material is not downloaded.66 In Romm, the defendant searched for and
62

Id. at 1205. Nearly 5000 child pornography images were discovered on the defendant’s
computer Id. at 1197. Because Tucker consistently deleted child pornography located in
the Internet Cache, the court concluded that he was in control of the pornographic images
and therefore possessed them. Id. at 1204.
63

See id. (acknowledging the defense that defendant merely viewed the material, but
rejecting the claim because defendant’s actions demonstrated control and possession).

64

Id.

65

Id. at 1204–05; see also Ty E. Howard, Don’t Cache Out Your Case: Prosecuting
Child Pornography Possession Laws Based on Images Located in Temporary Internet
Files, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1227, 1242 (2004) (explaining that the court found
defendant guilty of knowingly possessing child pornography). Howard explains:
The court similarly rejected Tucker’s claim that he could not possess
something without affirmatively downloading it. In particular, the court
noted that contrary to Tucker’s claims, the Internet neither put the
images on his computer on its own, nor exercised any volition. Rather,
Tucker himself “purposefully visited Internet sites for the express
purpose of viewing child pornography . . . .”
Id. (footnotes omitted).
66

United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 998 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that “a person can
receive and possess child pornography without downloading it, if he or she seeks it out
and exercises dominion and control over it” (citing Tucker, 305 F.3d at 1204)).
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viewed numerous images of child pornography and “enlarged them,”
which automatically saved the material to the Internet Cache.67 The court
ultimately convicted the defendant after law enforcement officers
discovered forty illegal images the defendant had deleted from the Internet
Cache.68
At trial, as in Tucker, the defendant contended that he did not
knowingly possess the child pornography located on his computer due to
its automatic transfer to his Internet Cache.69 The Romm court concluded
that because the defendant sought out and searched for the child
pornography, viewed it, enlarged the images, could copy and print out the
illegal material, and knew about the location of the files in the Internet
Cache, he knowingly possessed the images, regardless of whether or not
he manually downloaded the images.70 The Romm court inferred the
defendant’s knowledge that viewing child pornography images
automatically saves them in the computer’s Internet Cache folder;
therefore, the court convicted Romm of knowingly possessing child
pornography under the CPPA, although he never purposely downloaded
illegal material.71
Currently, American courts have encountered similar problems that
plagued previous courts such as Tucker, Romm, and Stulock.72 Until future
courts adequately define the phrase “intent to view,” similar problems
associated with possession will continue to arise.73 “Intent to view” should

67

Id. at 993.

68

Id.

69

Id. at 999.

70

Id. at 1000–01.

71

Id.

72
See, e.g., State v. Josephitis, 914 N.E.2d 607, 615–16 (2009) (discussing the
inconsistencies in determining possession in child pornography cases).
73

See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (Supp. II 2008).
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be satisfied by any acts that would likely lead a reasonable jury to
conclude that the defendant viewed child pornography.74 This reasoning is
in regard to situations where illegal material is found in a defendant’s
Internet Cache regardless of whether or not the defendant knew that the
computer stored images in the Internet Cache.75 Therefore, even if
defendants like those in Tucker and Romm lack adequate knowledge
regarding the location of child pornography in their Internet Cache, courts
should still convict the defendants.
3. Courts Must Learn and Grow from Past Decisions
Under the original 1996 CPPA, and similar state and military laws,
a court would not convict a defendant if it determined that the defendant
merely viewed child pornography without downloading the material.76 It is
understandable that Congress wanted to broaden the scope of the Act by
adding “intent to view” in the 2008 amendments as a means of convicting
defendants of possessing child pornography.77 Prior to the 2008

74

“While motive is the inducement to do some act, intent is the mental resolution or
determination to do it.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 881 (9th ed. 2009) (defining
“intent”) (emphasis added).
75

See supra Part II.A.2.

76

See United States v. Bass, 411 F.3d 1198, 1207 (10th Cir. 2005) (Kelly, J., dissenting)
(“Although reprehensible, viewing child pornography is not a crime.”); see also United
States v. Navrestad, 66 M.J. 262, 268 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (stating that when defendant does
not save or download child pornography, “viewing alone does not constitute ‘control’”).
77

See Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–358, § 102,
122 Stat. 4001 (2008) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2251 note) (explaining Congress’s intent
of enhancing, effectively, prosecution of child pornography cases). Congress enumerated
the reasons for enhancing the CPPA:
(1) Child pornography is estimated to be a multibillion dollar industry
of global proportions, facilitated by the growth of the Internet.
(2) Data has shown that 83 percent of child pornography possessors had
images of children younger than 12 years old, 39 percent had images of
children younger than 6 years old, and 19 percent had images of
children younger than 3 years old.
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amendments, many federal and state courts had substantial difficulties in
distinguishing the mere viewing of child pornography from convictable
possession of the material.78

(3) Child pornography is a permanent record of a child’s abuse and the
distribution of child pornography images revictimizes the child each
time the image is viewed.
(4) Child pornography is readily available through virtually every
Internet technology, including Web sites, email, instant messaging,
Internet Relay Chat, newsgroups, bulletin boards, and peer-to-peer.
(5) The technological ease, lack of expense, and anonymity in
obtaining and distributing child pornography over the Internet has
resulted in an explosion in the multijurisdictional distribution of child
pornography.
(6) The Internet is well recognized as a method of distributing goods
and services across State lines.
(7) The transmission of child pornography using the Internet constitutes
transportation in interstate commerce.
Id.
78

See Commonwealth v. Simone, 63 Va. Cir. 216, 262 (2003) (providing analogy to
situation of determining mere viewing or possession in child pornography cases). The
court in Simone explained that:
By analogy, one might consider the following hypothetical. If a person
walks down the street and notices an item (such as child pornography
or an illegal narcotic) whose possession is prohibited, has that person
committed a criminal offense if they look at the item for a sufficient
amount of time to know what it is and then walks away? The obvious
answer seems to be “no.” However, if the person looks at the item long
enough to know what it is, then reaches out and picks it up, holding and
viewing it, and taking it with them to their home, that person has
moved from merely viewing the item to knowingly possessing the item
by reaching out for it and controlling it.
Id. See also Howard, supra note 65, at 1265–66 (presenting illustration comparing mere
viewing of child pornography and possessing it). Howard questions that if a bookstore
patron, Peter Patron, requests child pornography magazines, sits in a chair, and peruses
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Furthermore, there was a strong argument that when a person
“merely viewed” child pornography, he actually did a great deal more than
simply look at illegal material.79 In order to “merely view” child
pornography from the Internet, a defendant must search for, access, and
view or enlarge videos or images depicting child pornography.80 That
entire process would have to occur prior to the defendant having the
capability of actually viewing the material.81 Applying the amended
version of the CPPA to cases such as Stulock would likely lead the courts
to find the defendants guilty of possessing child pornography, as the
defendants sought out and viewed illegal material on multiple occasions.82

the magazines, has he possessed the contraband if he does not purchase it? Howard
continues:
But is Peter just looking at the images? Consider an addition to the
analogy: after Peter sat down and began looking at the child
pornography, police enter the store and immediately approach Peter.
With the magazine still in his hand, open to pages with sexually explicit
images of children, Peter is arrested for possession of child
pornography. Later at trial, Peter’s lawyer argues that Peter was merely
viewing the images in the magazine and cannot be liable for possessing
them. However, the prosecution offers evidence that Peter specifically
requested the magazines that he knew contained child pornography and
received those magazines. Upon receipt, the magazines were under
Peter’s dominion and control – he flipped through them, turned them at
various angles, unfolded the centerfold, copied them on the bookstore’s
copy machine, showed them to other patrons, ripped pages from them,
attempted to steal the entire magazine by secreting it in his backpack,
and so on. Based on that evidence, there seems little doubt that, at the
moment the police arrested Peter, Peter knowingly possessed the child
pornography.
Id. at 1266.
79

See Howard, supra note 65, at 1266–67 (discussing process of viewing child
pornography via analogy).
80

See id. at 1267–68 (explaining that it takes effort to view child pornography).

81
See id. at 1268–69 (discussing accidental viewing and that child pornography viewers
do not merely stumble across illegal material).
82

Compare United States v. Stulock, 308 F.3d 922, 925–26 (8th Cir. 2002) (affirming the
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Therefore, when courts are unsure of whether to convict, they must
consider Congress’s intent in enacting both the original CPPA and its
2008 amendments, which enhance the prosecution of child pornography
defendants.83
B. The Developing Trojan Horse Defense
In response to the increase in accessibility of child pornography on
the Internet, and therefore a wide array of viruses, child pornography
defendants have recently begun raising the Trojan Horse Defense with
regularity.84 A defendant invokes the Trojan Horse Defense in an effort to

district court’s determination that defendants in child pornography cases cannot be found
guilty of possession for merely viewing child pornography), and United States v.
Navrestad, 66 M.J. 262, 268 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (establishing that like defendants under the
CPPA, military members cannot be found guilty of possessing child pornography for
merely viewing illegal material), with Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of
2007, Pub. L. No. 110-358, § 102, 122 Stat. 4001 (2008) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2251
note) (explaining Congress’s intent of enhancing, effectively, prosecution of child
pornography cases).
83

See Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007 § 102 (explaining
Congress’s intention to produce more effective and enhanced convictions of child
pornography defendants under the CPPA).
84

The Trojan Horse Defense is “any defense based on the alleged effects of malware,
whether a Trojan horse, virus, worm or other program.” Susan W. Brenner et al., The
Trojan Horse Defense in Cybercrime Cases, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 1, 11 (2004); see also United States v. Plugh, 576 F.3d 135, 138 (2d Cir. 2009)
(asserting that defendant lied to agents about “existence of a Trojan virus on his
computer”); United States v. McArthur, 573 F.3d 608, 614 (8th Cir. 2009) (disregarding
defendant’s conflicting argument that a computer virus deposited child pornography in
defendant-computer’s operating system); United States v. Shiver, 305 F. App’x 640, 643
(11th Cir. 2008) (rejecting defendant’s theory that a virus placed child pornography on
defendant’s computer);United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 63 & n.8 (3d Cir. 2008)
(providing testimony that a virus could download child pornography onto a person’s
computer); United States v. O’Keefe, 461 F.3d 1338, 1341 (11th Cir. 2006) (rejecting
defendant’s claim that computer viruses uploaded child pornography onto his websites
because the viruses were determined to be incapable of downloading child pornography);
United States v. Bass, 411 F.3d 1198, 1200 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding merit in defendant’s
claim that his computer suffered from a virus that automatically saved illegal child
pornography, but determining that defendant was still guilty of possessing the material);
United States v. Vaughn, Cr. No. F. 05-00482 OWW, 2008 WL 4104241, at *22 (E.D.
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establish a reasonable doubt in the fact-finders’ minds by claiming that
“Some-Other-Dude-Did-It.”85 A defendant must be found guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt to be convicted in a criminal trial; therefore, a successful
Trojan Horse Defense will leave the jury reasonably doubtful and lead to
the defendant’s acquittal.86 There is a growing concern regarding a
defendant’s ability to raise this defense to confuse the jury and utilize the
jury’s ignorance regarding the proper burden of proof.87

Cal. Sept. 3, 2008) (discussing defendant’s post-trial Trojan Virus Defense theory, which
appellate court disregarded and affirmed defendant’s conviction of possession of child
pornography).
85

See Brenner et al., supra note 84, at 10–15 (discussing how Trojan Horse Defense
attempts to prevent prosecution from establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). A
child pornography defendant who “raises the possibility that a Trojan horse or other
variety of malware is responsible for the crime with which he is charged, the prosecution
must, in effect, prove a negative beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 12; see also BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1518 (9th ed. 2009) (defining the SODDI – Some-Other-Dude-Did-It
– Defense as “a claim that somebody else committed a crime”).
86

See Brenner et al., supra note 84, at 9–10 (explaining defendant’s reasoning in
attempting to establish Trojan Horse Defense in conjunction with the SODDI Defense).
Brenner stated:
When defense counsel invites the jury to conclude that the defendant is
not guilty because he did not actually do the physical acts charged, or at
least the government has not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he
did, defense counsel will almost inevitably have to present at least
some suggestion as to who might have done the acts instead. The
typical juror will be less likely to develop reasonable doubts in the
abstract, than if the defense is able to sketch out some “reasonable”
alternative theory that will permit jurors to satisfy their natural human
curiosity about dramatic events, and also their sense that real events
must have some real-life explanation. As its moniker (“some other
dude”) implies, the SODDI defense usually attributes the commission
of the crime to some unknown perpetrator.
Id. (citing W. William Hodes, Seeking the Truth Versus Telling the Truth at the
Boundaries of the Law: Misdirection, Lying, and “Lying with an Explanation,” 44 S.
TEX. L. REV. 53, 59 n.18 (2002)).
87

See id. at 12–14 (“In a criminal prosecution, at least in the United States, the
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1. The Treatment of the Trojan Horse Defense in the United Kingdom
The Trojan Horse Defense first proved successful in cases tried in
the United Kingdom.88 In these initial cases, defendants argued that
because their computers were infected with viruses that could potentially
download illegal material or advertisements, the prosecution was unable to
convict them.89 The defense has likely been successful because jurors fear
being similarly situated to the defendant, since Trojan Horse viruses are
both easily disguised and common.90

government must prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This means that
if a defendant . . . raises the possibility that a Trojan horse or other variety of malware is
responsible for the crime with which he is charged, the prosecution must, in effect, prove
a negative beyond a reasonable doubt. That is, to survive a directed verdict of acquittal
and persuade the jury to convict such a defendant, the prosecution must disprove the
possibility the defense has raised beyond a reasonable doubt. As . . . case[s have]
demonstrated, this can be very difficult to do. At least for the present foreseeable future,
the availability of the defense raises concerns that defendants will be able to use a jury’s
ignorance, and likely suspicion, of technology to obtain an acquittal even when the
evidence overwhelmingly supports a conviction.”).
88

See id. at 8 (discussing defendant, Karl Schofield, who was acquitted of possessing
child pornography by raising Trojan Horse Defense); id. at 7 & n.17 (citing Schwartz,
supra note 10) (describing another situation where virus was blamed for downloading
child pornography)); see also Don Mackay, Trojan ‘Virus’ Left Kid Porn on My PC: Karl
Cleared After Two-Year Ordeal, MIRROR (U.K.), Apr. 18, 2003, at § News, available at
2003 WLNR 13123469 (explaining first recorded successful invocation of Trojan Horse
Defense).
89

See Brenner et al., supra note 84, at 8 (asserting early arguments raised by child
pornography defendants who raised Trojan Horse Defense).
90

See id. at 4 (explaining how Trojan horse viruses may appear to users as harmless
programs). Brenner and her colleagues assert that “[a] Trojan horse program, a variety of
malware, is ‘a program that appears to have some useful or benign purpose, but really
masks some hidden malicious functionality.’ Malicious functionality could include
anything from downloading contraband files to attacking other computers.” Id. at 4
(quoting ED SKOUDIS & LENNY ZELTSER, MALWARE: FIGHTING MALICIOUS CODE 251
(2004)) (defining Trojan virus).
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In most child pornography cases where the Trojan Horse Defense
is raised, computer forensic experts are the defendant’s only evidence.91
The Trojan Horse Defense has caused courts and countries, domestically
and internationally, to question how child pornography will be argued in
the near future.92 It is imperative that courts are aware of and understand
the Trojan Horse Defense because it will immensely impact how child
pornography will be prosecuted, and therefore, have a direct effect on the
social impact of child pornography.93
2. Hesitance in the Application of the Trojan Horse Defense
Although United Kingdom courts have accepted the Trojan Horse
Defense as a successful means of acquitting a child pornography
defendant, the United States has not followed suit.94 Only rarely has the

91

See Brenner et al., supra note 84, at 8 (discussing how computer forensics was utilized
in prosecution of Karl Schofield); supra note 9 (discussing cases that utilized computer
forensic testimony to discuss the Trojan Horse Defense).
92

See Jamie Smyth, Can a Virus Put Porn on Your PC?, IR. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2005, §
Features, available at 2005 WLNR 718976 (discussing proposals for changes in statutes
in cases concerning Trojan Horse Defense).
93

See infra notes 116–123 and accompanying text (discussing how the Trojan Horse
Defense has impacted child pornography cases).

94

See, e.g., United States v. Plugh, 576 F.3d 135, 138 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding that
defendant fabricated testimony regarding virus on his computer); United States v.
McArthur, 573 F.3d 608, 614 (8th Cir. 2009) (determining evidence insufficient to
support defendant’s invocation of Trojan Horse Defense); United States v. Shiver, 305 F.
App’x 640, 643 (11th Cir. 2008) (determining evidence sufficient to convict defendant of
possessing child pornography despite his use of Trojan Horse Defense); United States v.
Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 63 n.8, 66 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding evidence sufficient to support
inference that defendant downloaded child pornography despite defendant’s Trojan Horse
Defense); United States v. O’Keefe, 461 F.3d 1338, 1341–45 (11th Cir. 2006) (showing
defendant’s raising of Trojan Horse Defense insufficient to overcome conviction by jury
on possessing child pornography under the CPPA); United States v. Bass, 411 F.3d 1198,
1200–01 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding by jury that defendant was guilty of knowing
possession of child pornography though defendant said computer was infected with
virus); United States v. Vaughn, Cr. No. F. 05-00482 OWW, 2008 WL 4104241, at *22
(E.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2008) (determining that Trojan Horse Defense did not lead to a
reversal of lower court’s decision to convict defendant of possessing child pornography
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Trojan Horse Defense been successful in United States courts.95
Regardless of whether domestic courts have acquitted child pornography
defendants based on the Trojan Horse Defense, it is imperative for courts
to understand the defense because of its recently frequent usage.96
In United States v. Miller, the court ultimately found that the
convictions against the defendant violated the double jeopardy clause.97
The court’s analysis of the Trojan Horse Defense, however, did not lead to
the reversal of Miller’s possession of child pornography conviction.98 The
FBI discovered a zip disk in Miller’s home that held between 1200 and
1400 images, twenty of which constituted child pornography.99 The day
after Miller’s home was searched and the pornography was discovered, the
defendant contacted the interviewing FBI agent, Agent Kyle.100 Miller
informed Agent Kyle that the child pornography was likely a result of a
virus that had infected Miller’s computer a year before the search.101

under the CPPA).
95

See Brenner et al., supra note 84, at 8 n.22 (citing Patricia Dedrick, Auditor: Virus
Caused Errors, BIRMINGHAM NEWS (Ala.), Aug. 26, 2003, § News, at 142, available at
2003 WLNR 15960131 (explaining rare case – tax fraud – where defendant successfully
raised Trojan Horse Defense; the jury acquitted the defendant, who blamed a virus for his
underreporting over $630,000 in income over a few years).
96

See O’Keefe, 461 F.3d at 1340 (explaining that defendant was appealing district court
convictions for receiving, advertising, and possessing child pornography under the
CPPA). O’Keefe, a high school math teacher, created two child pornography websites,
“hctweens” and “modelquest,” which he said he developed to entrap child predators, but
“his crusading efforts were thwarted when the websites were hacked into and altered by
computer viruses to include pornographic images of children.” Id. at 1340–41.

97

Miller, 527 F.3d at 73–74.

98

Id. at 66–69.

99

Id. at 58.

100

Id. at 65.

101

Id.
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The government’s expert witness presented a record that revealed
the dates that the pornographic images were created, written, and accessed
on the zip disk, substantiating the government’s claim that Miller
downloaded the material.102 One agent testified that he was unable to
prove sufficiently whether Miller or a virus accessed the images.103 The
Miller court used four factors, with a totality of the circumstances
approach, to determine that the defendant downloaded and accessed the
child pornography.104 The first factor was “whether images were found on
the defendant’s computer.”105 The second factor was the number of
images of child pornography that were found.106 The third factor was
“whether the content of the images ‘was evident from their file names.’”107
The fourth factor was the “defendant’s knowledge of and ability to access
the storage area for the images.”108
At trial, the court convicted Miller of receiving and possessing
child pornography.109 The computer forensic experts in Miller “[b]oth . . .
acknowledged the possibility that child pornography could be
unknowingly downloaded onto a hard drive as the result of a virus, or
‘spyware.’”110 However, the experts disagreed as to whether it was likely
that this possibility occurred in Miller’s case. “Agent Price testified that he

102

Id.

103

Id.

104

Id. at 67.

105

Id. (citing United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 122 (2d Cir. 2006)).

106

Id.

107

Id. (quoting United States v. Payne, 341 F.3d 393, 403(5th Cir. 2003)).

108

Id. (citing United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 997–1001 (9th Cir. 2006)).

109

Id. at 58, 72.

110

Id. at 63 n.8.
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was unaware of there ever being . . . ‘any reports of a child porn dropping
virus.’”111
Further, the FBI agent in Miller strongly disagreed with the
defendant’s computer forensic expert’s testimony that a virus could
download only child pornography, because the agent maintained “that
such a virus would have to ‘take the zip diskette out of the case, put it into
the computer . . . , take the zip out, put it back in the case and delete the
original images off the computer.’”112 Agent Price could only point to the
defendant as the cause of the presence of the child pornography.113 The
Miller court determined that the defendant’s Trojan Horse Defense and
accompanying computer forensic expert testimony were too weak to
acquit the defendant of the charges; however, due to a double jeopardy
violation, the court could not convict Miller for possession of child
pornography.114
3. Proposed Factors for Analyzing the Trojan Horse Defense
A number of academics and courts have suggested possible ways
courts could address situations where a defendant raises the Trojan Horse
Defense in order to obtain justice.115 When considering the Trojan Horse
Defense, courts should consider the “repeat behavior model,” which

111

Id.

112

Id. Agent Price did not believe that a computer virus would be capable of performing
this complex series of functions; therefore, as an expert, he believed that the Trojan Horse
Defense was inadequate of leading to an acquittal for Miller. See id.
113

Id. at 63 n.8, 66.

114

Id. at 66–69, 73–74.

115

See, e.g., Brenner et al., supra note 84, at 21–37 (explaining ways for prosecution to
rebut the Trojan Horse Defense); Note, Child Pornography, the Internet, and the
Challenge of Updating Statutory Terms, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2206, 2224 (2009)
(discussing repeat behavior model, that courts can utilize when presented with the Trojan
Horse Defense); see also Miller, 527 F.3d at 67 (discussing a four-factor test to determine
whether defendant knowingly received child pornography).
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contemplates the consistency, if any, of the defendant’s actions.116 If a
defendant can pinpoint when the virus began infecting the computer,
computer forensic experts can compare the infection date with the date
when the computer acquired the illegal images.117
Another method of handling Trojan Horse Defense invocations is
to determine the defendant’s level of “computer expertise.”118 Defendants
who are shown to be proficient with computers are unlikely to fall victim
to computer viruses and Trojan Horses.119 Finally, courts can determine if
the defendant has computer software programmed for the purpose of
removing images and clearing the defendant’s browsing history.120 If these
116

See Note, supra note 117, at 2224 (“Courts should look not to whether multiple
images have appeared on a user’s computer during a concrete period of time when the
computer was infected, but to whether images have been obtained on several separate
occasions over time. A virus can, for example, persistently download images, but it
seems unlikely that an individual would obtain viruses that collect child pornography on
multiple separate occasions. By isolating the time frame in which the user claims his
computer was infected, courts can determine if there are other periods in which images
were transferred to the computer.”).

117

See id.

118

Brenner et al., supra note 84, at 22.

119

See id. Brenner explains that:
[I]t seems likely that those who invoke the Trojan horse defense will
claim they know little, if anything, about computer technology and
were therefore vulnerable to being exploited by an unknown hacker
who used their computer for unlawful purposes without their
knowledge. If such a claim is part of defendant’s invocation of the
defense, the prosecution may be able to rebut the defense by showing
that the defendant is, in fact, knowledgeable about computers and what
is required to protect them. Such evidence can be used to cast doubt on
a defendant’s claim that he must have been infected by Trojan horses or
other types of malware when he opened suspicious emails or suspicious
email attachments.

Id. (citing Program Put Child Porn Pics on My PC, GET READING (U.K.), Apr. 16, 2003,
http://www.getreading.co.uk/news/s/6541_program_put_child_porn_pics_on_my_pc).
120

See United States v. Bass, 411 F.3d 1198, 1202 (10th Cir. 2005).
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programs are located on the defendant’s computer, it is likely that they
were downloaded or installed to prevent authorities from tracing the
defendant’s illegal activity.121 Courts must thoroughly understand the
Trojan Horse Defense to prevent confusion, which frequently results from
the highly technical evidentiary aspects associated with the defense.122
Furthermore, when faced with the Trojan Horse Defense, courts must also
consider how the acquittal of a child pornography defendant leads to
severe social impacts.
III. THE SOCIAL IMPACT ASSOCIATED WITH CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND
HOW CONSISTENT PROSECUTION RECOGNIZES CONGRESS’S INTENTIONS IN
ENACTING THE CPPA
The acts of producing, viewing, and disseminating child
pornography are considered incredibly evil and punishable in the eyes of
society.123 It is not surprising, then, that few defenses are successful during
criminal proceedings of child pornography defendants.124 Society and

121

See id. (“However, the jury here reasonably could have inferred that Bass knew child
pornography was automatically saved to his mother’s computer based on evidence that
Bass attempted to remove the images. There is ample evidence that Bass used two
software programs, “History Kill” and “Window Washer,” in an attempt to remove child
pornography from the computer. Bass admitted he had used both “History-Kill” and
“Window Washer” to delete child pornography because “he didn’t want his mother to see
those images . . . .”).
122

See United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 63 n.8, 65–67 (discussing conflicting expert
testimony and the difficulty of determining whether a virus or a user accessed the images
of child pornography).
123

Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244–45 (2002) (“The sexual abuse of a
child is a most serious crime and an act repugnant to the moral instincts of a decent
people. In its legislative findings, Congress recognized that there are subcultures of
persons who harbor illicit desires for children and commit criminal acts to gratify the
impulses.”).
124

See United States v. Shiver, 305 F. App’x 640, 643 (11th Cir. 2008) (rejecting
defendant’s claim that a virus downloaded images of child pornography onto his
computer); United States v. O’Keefe, 461 F.3d 1338, 1341, 1350 (11th Cir. 2006)
(finding defendant guilty despite his Trojan Horse Defense); Bass, 411 F.3d at 1200
(convicting defendant despite his argument that a computer virus saved child
pornography images on his computer); United States v. Vaughn, Cr. No. F. 05-00482
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Congress take strong positions in the fight against child pornography.125
The multitude of laws on this topic illustrates this claim; however, courts
are often inconsistent in executing these laws because of the possession
element and the new defenses.126
Upon realization of the importance of halting the expansion of
child pornography, Congress enacted the first anti-child pornography
legislation in 1977.127 This initial ban on child pornography signified the
beginning of a battle that continued to rage on for three decades.128 As
technology expanded, and accessibility to child pornography became
easier, Congress continued to intensify and to extend the bans on child
pornography through amendments.129 Since its original enactment in 1996,
the CPPA has undergone significant amendments.130 These amendments
reflect society’s increasing reliance on the Internet.131 However, the

OWW, 2008 WL 4104241, at *22 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2008) (rejecting post-trial argument
of the Trojan Horse Defense).
125

See, e.g., Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 244–45; see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
764 (1982) (determining that child pornography is illegal and unprotected by the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution).
126

See cases cited supra note 32; Brenner et al., supra note 84, at 12–14 (describing how
courts must be aware of potential problems associated with defendants’ ability to invoke
the Trojan Horse Defense).

127

See Note, supra note 115, at 2208 (citing Protection of Children Against Sexual
Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 7 (1978)).
128

Id. at 2208–09; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a) (Supp. II 1996) (criminalizing
transportation, possession, receiving, and producing of child pornography).
129

See Note, supra note 115, at 2208; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (Supp. II
2008) (providing amended statutory provisions relating to the expansion of laws against
child pornography).
130
See Note, supra note 115, at 2208–10 (explaining how Congress amended the CPPA,
but courts may still encounter questions regarding its application).
131

See id. at 2206.
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amendments have not yet been fully tested.132 The inclusion of “intent to
view” was an important congressional step toward extending the
prohibition against child pornography, but the amendment’s significance
will depend on what definition future courts provide the phrase.133
During the development of the CPPA, Congress enumerated its
reasons for protecting children against sexual abuse through child
pornography.134 Congress sought to criminalize child pornography
because it invades children’s privacy and interests by haunting the
depicted children, and it strengthens pedophiles’ deviant sexual desires.135
132

See supra notes 13, 32 (discussing the amendments to the CPPA and how courts have
inconsistently interpreted the possession element).
133

See Note, supra note 115, at 2206–07 (instructing that when courts are faced with
questions regarding the CPPA, they must consider the congressional intent to enhance
prosecution of child pornography offenders under the 2009 amendments).
134

H.R. 4123, 104th Cong. § 2 (1996).

135

Id. Reasons outlined by Congress include:
(7) The creation or distribution of child pornography which includes an
image of a recognizable minor invades the child’s privacy and
reputational interest, since images that are created showing a child’s
face or other identifiable feature on a body engaging in sexually
explicit conduct can haunt the minor for years to come;
(8) [because of] the effect of visual depictions of child sexual activity
on a child molester or pedophile using that material to stimulate or
whet his own sexual appetites, or on a child where the material is being
used as a means of seducing or breaking down the child’s inhibitions to
sexual abuse or exploitation; . . .
(10)(A) [because] the existence of and traffic in child pornographic
images creates the potential for many types of harm in the community
and presents a clear and present danger to all children; . . .
(11)(A) [because] the sexualization and eroticization of minors through
any form of child pornographic images has a deleterious effect on all
children by encouraging a societal perception of children as sexual
objects and leading to further sexual abuse and exploitation of them;
and
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Through the enactment of the CPPA, Congress took a vital step towards
ending child pornography in the United States.136 Further, the passage of
the Act signaled Congress’s and the government’s compelling interest in
eliminating such a heinous practice.137
When confronted with these delicate situations, courts must
consider the legislative concerns articulated by Congress when enacting
the CPPA. While Congress and society have vehemently opposed child
pornography, courts have had considerable difficulty consistently
prosecuting child pornography defendants.138 In order to strengthen the
fight against child pornography, courts must consider the congressional
intentions and legislative history associated with the CPPA.
CONCLUSION
Although courts struggle for consistency in prosecuting child
pornography defendants, Congress strives to clarify its intent through
continuous amendments of the CPPA.139 In the near future, courts will
have the opportunity to define “intent to view” and will likely be
confronted with similar possession problems that have plagued courts for
decades.140 Because of the severe impact of child pornography on society,

(B) this sexualization of minors creates an unwholesome
environment which affects the psychological, mental and emotional
development of children and undermines the efforts of parents and
families to encourage the sound, mental, moral, and emotional
development of children[.]
Id.
136

Note, supra note 115, at 2208.

137

See generally H.R. 4123 § 2 (illustrating the government’s interest in ending child
pornography in the United States).
138

See cases cited supra note 32.

139

See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (Supp. II 2008) (amending statutory provisions to
expand the law against child pornography).

140

Compare United States v. Stulock, 308 F.3d 922, 923–25 (8th Cir. 2002) (affirming
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it is imperative that courts wade through the technical defenses overcome
any confusion about the possession element of the CPPA.
To provide children with copious protection from sexual abuse,
courts should convict defendants for mere viewing of child pornography
or when law enforcement agents find evidence of the illegal material in the
defendant’s Internet Cache.141 Courts must consider the reasons why
Congress enacted the CPPA and those acts that Congress previously
passed to prevent sexual abuse against children.142 Courts that are
prepared to confront the problems associated with the possession element
of the CPPA and the Trojan Horse Defense will be better able to apply the
CPPA properly. Accurate application of the CPPA will lead to consistent
execution of Congress’s intent, and children will be better protected
against sexual abuse through child pornography.

that defendant was innocent of possessing child pornography because he did not
download material), with United States v. Tucker, 305 F.3d 1193, 1204–05 (10th Cir.
2002) (holding that defendant satisfied the possession element of the CPPA by merely
viewing child pornography and thus storing it in the Internet Cache).
141

See United States v. Grober, 595 F. Supp. 2d 382, 408 (D.N.J. 2008) (referring to
child pornography as a “grave impact on society”); United States v. Farris, No.
2:08cr145, 2008 WL 1944131, at *8 (W.D. Pa. May 1, 2008) (discussing significant
physical and psychological harm associated with child pornography).
142

See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 241 (2002); New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747, 749 (1982).
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